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Abstract
Many decisions in life are sequential and constrained by a time window. Although mathe-
matically derived optimal solutions exist, it has been reported that humans often deviate
from making optimal choices. Here, we used a secretary problem, a classic example of finite
sequential decision-making, and investigated the mechanisms underlying individuals’ sub-
optimal choices. Across three independent experiments, we found that a dynamic program-
ming model comprising subjective value function explains individuals’ deviations from
optimality and predicts the choice behaviors under fewer and more opportunities. We further
identified that pupil dilation reflected the levels of decision difficulty and subsequent choices
to accept or reject the stimulus at each opportunity. The value sensitivity, a model-based
estimate that characterizes each individual’s subjective valuation, correlated with the extent
to which individuals’ physiological responses tracked stimuli information. Our results provide
model-based and physiological evidence for subjective valuation in finite sequential deci-
sion-making, rediscovering human suboptimality in subjectively optimal decision-making
processes.
Author summary
In many real-life decisions, such as hiring an employee, the current candidate is the only
option decision-makers can choose among sequentially revealed options, while past
options are forgone and future options are unknown. To make the best choice in such
problems, decision-makers should set appropriate criteria considering the distribution of
values and remaining chances. Here, we provide behavioral and physiological evidence
for subjective valuation that explains how individuals set criteria deviating from optimal-
ity. The extent to which individuals expect from candidates, how sensitive they are to the
value of candidates, and how costly it is to examine each candidate determine the way
how individuals make choices. Our results suggest that seemingly suboptimal decision
strategies in finite sequential decisions may be optimal in subjective valuation.
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Introduction
Hiring a new employee is one of the toughest decisions to make as a team leader. Most of the
time, there are only a limited number of job openings available and a limited time period in
which to complete the hiring process. This process is even more difficult when applicants are
accepted on a rolling basis, because one has to make a choice whether to accept the current
applicant without knowing whether other future potential applicants would have been a bet-
ter fit for the job. Likewise, there are many decision problems in life that are sequential and
constrained by a certain time window. The ‘secretary problem’ is a classic example of this
finite sequential decision problem and has been widely used to understand the optimal policy
in making choices (e.g., to hire or not) under a limited number of opportunities [1,2]. Pro-
vided with the full information (i.e., distribution of candidates), the optimal solution for the
problem is to choose the first number that is above a mathematically calculated decision
threshold [3]. However, it is not clear whether and how humans deviate from optimal
choices. Here, we used one variant of the secretary problem [4], in which the distribution of
candidates is given and the reward is the value of the chosen candidate, to investigate
(i) whether individuals make the optimal decision in a finite sequential decision problem,
and (ii) if not, how do they make their decisions. Our results provide behavioral and physio-
logical evidence supporting that individuals make threshold-based choices in a finite sequen-
tial decision problem and that seemingly suboptimal decision patterns (deviation from the
optimal) originate from the process of optimally calculating thresholds using individuals’
subjective value function.
Since the 1960’s when the secretary problem was originally introduced, a vast amount of
studies were conducted examining the optimal solution of the problem [2–5]. Although an
equally large volume of studies followed focusing on biases in human choice patterns, the
major stream took a descriptive approach explaining the extent to which human choices
drifted apart from the optimal solution [6–9], leaving where the bias originated from an open
question.
In various psychological studies, including an optimal stopping problem in the mate choice
domain [10] and consumers’ purchasing decisions [11,12], it was suggested that individuals’
heuristic valuation, the framework of Prospect theory [13], underlies the biases observed in
their decision patterns [14]. Specifically, the Prospect theory has shown that individuals’
choices are guided by subjective valuation of potential gains and losses relative to the context
where they are situated [13]. We constructed a computational model that adopts this concept
of ‘reference point’ and examined whether the process of subjective valuation explains how
individuals’ decision processes deviate from the optimal decision strategy. In addition, to cap-
ture individual differences in subjective valuation, we hypothesized that nonlinear value sensi-
tivity (i.e., concave value function for gains and convex value function for losses) [13] would
take crucial parts in determining individuals’ decision patterns.
To examine how individuals make choices in a finite sequential decision problem, we
recorded behavioral choices and response time (RT) of 87 participants (male/female = 43/44,
age = 22.74 ± 1.98 years) as they made a series of choices to accept or reject a random number
presented on the screen (Fig 1A). During each round, they had a fixed amount of opportuni-
ties (chances) to evaluate a new random number by rejecting previously presented numbers.
When they accepted, the presented number was added to their final payoff, and then they
moved on to the next round (up to 200 rounds) that consisted of a new set of chances. We
implemented two separate experiments. In Experiment 1, participants had up to five opportu-
nities (K = 5), and they were not explicitly informed of the maximum number that would be
presented. Experiment 2 tested three distinctive contexts where participants had up to two,
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five, or ten opportunities (K = 2, 5, or 10), and the participants were informed of the full distri-
bution information (including the maximum).
Various theoretical and experimental studies took into account physical and/or mental
efforts as a cost (or cost function) in subjective valuation [for review, see 15,16]. In line with
the literature, we assumed that individuals would take into account a mental cost (referred to
as ‘waiting cost’ hereafter) in valuation processes. Such an assumption is also linked with previ-
ous other studies where a version of secretary problem is used with their focuses being on the
impact of sampling cost [8,17,18]. Thus, we also included a waiting cost [8,18] parameter as a
linear disutility (negative subjective value), which captures a broad range of mental costs dur-
ing decision processes (see Methods for detailed model structure; see Text A in S1 File for
detailed model justification).
In conjunction with the computational modeling approach, we recorded individuals’ pupil
dilation responses and analyzed their association with participants’ choice behaviors to cor-
roborate our suggested model. A rich set of evidence suggests that pupil dilation (or contrac-
tion)—a neurophysiological signature coinciding with norepinephrine levels in the brain—
reflects not only individuals’ arousal level [19,20], but also cognitively complex information,
such as value [21,22], uncertainty [19], surprise [23], cognitive conflict [24,25], and choice
[26]. More specifically, recent studies showed that pupil-linked neuromodulatory systems
have a critical role in decision formation, rather than simply in reflection of the decision
Fig 1. Experimental procedures and behavioral results of Experiment 1. (A) Participants made a series of choices between accepting and
rejecting a presented number. At each round, they had up to K opportunities (K = 5 in Experiment 1, K = 2 or 5 in Experiment 2) to reject
the number and get a new random number; the round ended when participants accepted a presented number. At the last opportunity,
participants were given no choice but to accept the presented number. A new set of stimuli (numbers) was used in the next round. (B) The
optimal decision threshold per opportunity (blue), calculated under the assumption of the full information, was compared with a
corresponding empirical decision threshold (red). (C) Response times (RTs) for each opportunity were computed against the presented
stimuli values. Regardless of the opportunity, RTs showed negative association with the absolute distance between the presented stimuli and
the corresponding decision threshold. That is, participants showed the shortest RTs for the numbers that are farthest from decision
thresholds, and vice versa. Error bars represent s.e.m.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009633.g001
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consequences [26], and moreover that the size of pupil responses is associated with individu-
als’ choice patterns [27,28].
Based on these previous studies, we hypothesized that individuals’ pupil responses would
be linked to their decision processes in three folds; i) pupil responses may be larger to the
options that will be accepted versus rejected, ii) pupil dilation may reflect the deviation
between option values and decision thresholds, supporting value- and threshold- based deci-
sion processes, and iii) pupil responses in individuals who show larger value sensitivity may be
larger. To test these hypotheses, we conducted an additional experiment (Experiment 3) where
actions (choosing to accept or reject) were temporally dissociated from physiological responses
to stimuli; participants (N = 24, male/female = 12/12, age = 22.67 ± 2.28 years) were not
allowed to make a choice until an audio cue was played. All the other settings were equal to
Experiment 2 where participants had up to five chances (K = 5). Non-overlapping samples
were obtained from each experiment (see Methods for detailed procedures).
Results
Experiment 1
Individuals show higher decision thresholds than the optimal decision model. In
Experiment 1, participants had up to five opportunities within each round to examine a pre-
sented number and make choices either to accept or reject. Each presented number, sampled
from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 150, could be considered as an option whose
value matches its face value (the number). Note that here in Experiment 1, participants were
not explicitly informed of the distribution (including the maximum) from where the numbers
were extracted. Because individuals can only accept a single number within each round, they
should accept a number only when it is large enough. Specifically, an optimal decision-maker
should not accept a presented number unless it is larger than the expected value of successive
opportunities. For example, individuals should accept any numbers at the last opportunity
(i.e., the fifth opportunity in Experiment 1) and thus the expected value of the last opportunity
is 75. Based on this information, at the opportunity one before the last (the fourth in Experi-
ment 1), a value-maximizing individual should accept any numbers higher than 75 but reject
other numbers. Following the dynamic programming approach [29], we computed an optimal
threshold for each opportunity (Fig 1B, blue).
To examine whether individuals follow such decision processes, we calculated empirical
thresholds—the value where individuals were equally likely to accept or reject—at individual
level using each individuals’ behavioral choices (male/female = 10/10, age = 22.85 ± 1.31 years)
(Fig 1B). Consistent with the optimal thresholds (blue), empirical thresholds (red) at the later
opportunities were lower than those at the earlier opportunities (mean threshold differences
between the first and the second = 4.70, t(19) = 5.24, Cohen’s d = 1.17, p = 4.66e-5; the
second and the third = 5.39, t(19) = 3.99, Cohen’s d = 0.89, p = 7.84e-4; and the third and the
fourth = 15.38, t(19) = 7.10, Cohen’s d = 1.59, p = 9.41e-7). However, participants showed
empirical thresholds significantly higher than the optimal thresholds, indicating that people
have higher expectations about later opportunities (the difference between empirical and opti-
mal thresholds = 8.49, t(19) = 3.28, Cohen’s d = 0.73, p = 0.004).
Compared with optimal thresholds, it is not difficult to notice that the average empirical
thresholds have a shallower slope as evidenced by the increasing difference between the empir-
ical and optimal thresholds across opportunities (mean slope of [empirical—optimal]: 3.75, t
(19) = 4.40, Cohen’s d = 0.98, p = 3.08e-4). Although the empirical decision thresholds suggest
otherwise, one may still suspect that an alternative heuristic individuals might have used was
to apply a constant threshold regardless of the number of remaining opportunities (i.e.,
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applying a constant threshold across all opportunities). It is well known that easier choices—
here, deciding whether to accept or not the presented value that is far smaller or larger than
the threshold—require shorter response times (RT) [30,31, see 32 for review]. If individuals
applied the same threshold across all opportunities, mean RTs should be symmetric around a
fixed value (i.e., fixed threshold), whereas if individuals applied differential thresholds at each
opportunity, RTs should be symmetric around the thresholds that correspond to the opportu-
nity. To examine this possibility, we calculated mean RT within each opportunity. The sym-
metric pattern was observed only when mean RTs were calculated as a function of presented
values adjusting for the estimated empirical threshold within each corresponding opportunity
(Fig 1C). This result suggests that individuals did apply differential thresholds for each oppor-
tunity during decision-making.
Subjective optimality explains individual choice patterns. Prospect theory has suggested
that outcomes are perceived as gains and losses relative to a certain reference point, and that
gains and losses are valued following concave and convex subjective value functions, respec-
tively [13]. We drew on this framework to evaluate potential decision processes accounting for
individuals’ sub-optimal decision thresholds. In accordance with Prospect theory, we hypothe-
sized that individuals’ subjective valuation (Util) for a given value (v) is dependent on their
individual reference point (r) and nonlinear value sensitivity (ρ), as follows:
Util ¼ v   rð Þr if v � r
Util ¼   r   vð Þr otherwise:
In the current study, we assume that individuals would set an expectation about future out-
comes and use the expectation as a reference point [33] (see Text A in S1 File for detailed
model justification). Note, we focused on valuation per se, and thus, the time it took for indi-
viduals to establish (learn) their reference points (their own perspective of the environment)
was assumed negligible (Figs H and I in S1 File; see Discussion for further consideration of
learning effects). Importantly, two additional components were introduced. First, individuals
may perceive the waiting time until acceptance costly and take it into account in valuation
[8,18]. Second, we hypothesized that this subjective value-based computation occurs not only
during active decision-making, but also at mental simulation such that individuals use their
subjective valuation in constructing expectations of each opportunity (i.e., computing decision
thresholds; Fig 2A).
This ‘Subjective optimality model’ with a waiting cost converges to three nested models in
special cases: the Subjective optimality model without a waiting cost (Cost = 0), the Optimal
decision model (ρ = 1), and the Constant threshold model (ρ = 0) (see Methods for model
details). A formal model comparison using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) revealed that
the Subjective optimality models with and without a potential waiting cost showed superior
explanatory power compared to the other two nested decision models (Fig A in S1 File).
Between the two Subjective optimality models, the model without a waiting cost showed a bet-
ter model-fit than the model with a waiting cost (95% CI of ΔAIC = [-2.082, -0.099]; see Fig A
in S1 File). These results suggest that the waiting cost was negligible in Experiment 1 and that
individuals used the reference point significantly larger than zero (mean r = 110.51, Fig G in
S1 File), which set values larger than the reference point as gains, and any value stimuli smaller
than the reference point as potential losses (Fig 2B). Moreover, this result indicates that indi-
viduals use marginally diminishing (concave) and increasing (convex) subjective value func-
tion for gains and losses, respectively, in finite sequential decision-making.
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From the formal model comparison, we noticed that our suggested computational model
showed comparable model-fit with some of the alternative models including the Linear thresh-
old model, a model recently presented to well explain human stopping decisions in sequential
decision-making [34]. Here, besides examining model fits, we examined whether the distinc-
tive linear feature of the Linear threshold model presents in our empirical data. Decision
thresholds calculated from empirical data showed a decreasing pattern along the opportunities
(Fig 1B), but moreover, the extent of threshold change between opportunities also showed a
decreasing pattern (i.e., second derivative of the decision threshold curve < 0; Fig 2C). Such a
qualitative difference between the linear threshold model and the empirical data was corrobo-
rated by the observed statistical difference across opportunities ([1st-2nd] vs [2nd-3rd] vs [3rd-
4th]; F(2, 38) = 14.13, η2 = 0.43, p = 2.59e-05). These results suggest that individuals’ choice
data in the current variant of Secretary problem task cannot be fully explained by the Linear
threshold model.
Experiment 2
The Subjective optimality model predicts behavioral alterations in the context of scarce
opportunity. In our suggested model, a change of reference point reframes one’s subjective
valuation and, in turn, alters decision thresholds. As described earlier, we assumed that indi-
viduals would set an expectation about future outcomes based on the number of opportunities
they have, rather than trial-by-trial experience (c.f., [35]), and use the expectation as a refer-
ence point [33]. That is, we predicted that, based on our suggested model, one would set a
lower (or higher) reference point in the context where one expects less (more) overall out-
comes, which consequently lower (heighten) their decision thresholds. To examine whether
empirical data matches the prediction from the model, we conducted a second experiment
using a between-group design where one group of participants had two (K = 2), the second
group of participants had five (K = 5), and the third group of participants had ten opportuni-
ties (K = 10) in each round (Fig 1A). For all three separate task conditions (K = 2, 5, and 10),
Fig 2. Subjective optimality model. (A) The optimal decision model assumes that individuals compute the decision threshold of a certain
opportunity based on the expected value of successive opportunities. In the ‘Subjective optimality model’, expected values of the successive
opportunities are replaced by expected utilities (EU) calculated based on the subjective value function as per Prospective theory. (B) Two free
parameters, reference point, and nonlinear value sensitivity define subjective valuation of the presented stimuli values. Group average subjective
value function (green) is depicted using the group mean of individual estimates: reference point = 110.51; value sensitivity = 0.62. (C) Decision
thresholds calculated from empirical data showed a decreasing pattern along the opportunities, but moreover, the extent of threshold change
between opportunities also showed a decreasing pattern (i.e., second derivative of the decision threshold curve< 0). Such a change in the slope
of decision threshold curve is a unique feature that our suggested Subjective optimality model successfully could explain (differences between
the model and empirical data do not vary across opportunities; F(2, 38) = 0.70, η2 = 0.036, p = 0.090), and has superior explanatory power to the
linear threshold model. Negative values on the y-axis indicate that decision thresholds decrease between opportunities. Error bars indicate
s.e.m.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009633.g002
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participants were informed that the maximum possible number that would be presented was
150, and any numbers between 0 and 150 (inclusive) were equally likely to appear.
Individuals who had up to two opportunities (K = 2) always had to accept the second value
if they rejected the first presented stimulus. In the Optimal decision model, decision thresholds
are determined by the number of remaining opportunities and expected values calculated fol-
lowing the dynamic programming approach [29]. This means that regardless of the total num-
ber of opportunities (K = 2, 5, or 10), individuals should be facing the same problem at the
opportunity preceding the last (i.e., the first opportunity in K = 2, the fourth in K = 5, and the
ninth in K = 10) if they were following the Optimal decision model. On the contrary, the Sub-
jective optimality model predicts differently. The decision thresholds depend on individuals’
reference point at a given context, which is dependent on the total number of opportunities
and the expected future earnings in the context.
As predicted from the Subjective optimality model, the decision thresholds estimated from
participants (K = 2: N = 23, male/female = 11/12, age = 23.09 ± 2.09 years; K = 5: N = 21, male/
female = 11/10, age = 23.19 ± 1.86 years; K = 10: N = 20, male/female = 10/10, age =
22.00 ± 2.41; non-overlapping from Experiment 1) were significantly different depending on
the number of opportunities one had per round (thresholdK = 2, 1st = 79.28 ± 15.45, thresh-
oldK = 5, 4th = 90.42 ± 9.72, thresholdK = 10, 9th = 93.50 ± 17.77; F(2,61) = 5.69, η2 = 0.157,
p = 0.0054; post-hoc comparison K = 5 vs 2: CI = [0.49, 21.78], p = 0.038; K = 10 vs 2: CI =
[3.44, 25.00], p = 0.0067; K = 10 vs 5: CI = [-7.93, 14.10], p = 0.78; Fig H in S1 File). Note that
decision thresholds and response time patterns for Experiment 2 (K = 5) were comparable
with those of Experiment 1 (Fig 3A and Fig B in S1 File), indicating that informing the full dis-
tribution information to participants did not have any noticeable effects. Furthermore, a
model comparison using AIC scores revealed that the Subjective optimality models with and
without a potential waiting cost explained individuals’ choice behaviors comparably well (95%
CI of ΔAIC = [-2.047, 3.519]), but significantly better than other models (see Fig A in S1 File
for model comparison results).
Next, we examined whether our model quantitatively captures behavioral alterations
dependent on the scarcity or abundancy of opportunities. Again, we hypothesized that the
changes in the number of opportunities and the corresponding changes in expected future
outcomes would manifest the adjustments of reference points. To compute the prediction, we
simulated choice behaviors by adjusting the reference point parameter while keeping all the
other parameters estimated from the empirical data in K = 5. As depicted in Fig 3B, the model
predicts that the decision thresholds at the opportunity preceding the last will vary accord-
ingly. Consistent with our prediction, the observed behavioral thresholds closely matched the
model-based threshold predictions for K = 2 (78.50 ± 4.09) and K = 10 (92.55± 3.58) (see
Methods for model prediction details). Note that a direct parameter estimation from the
empirical data revealed that individuals’ characteristics (e.g., value sensitivity) in subjective val-
uation other than the reference point were indeed comparable between the task conditions,
consistent with the assumption we made for the model-based threshold prediction (Fig 3C
and Fig G in S1 File). The performance of model-based prediction showed comparable results
when the empirical data in K = 10 were used to predict decision thresholds for K = 2 and 5
(Fig C in S1 File). Besides the prediction approach, we also confirmed that empirical decision
threshold curves from Experiment 2 also showed negative second derivative across contexts,
and that Subjective optimality model captures the patterns (Fig 3D). These results suggest that
change of the decision context indeed alters individuals’ reference point and their choice pat-
terns, and that the reference point has a critical role in finite sequential decision-making.
One may suggest that the task with K = 2 is simple enough for participants and that they
would have followed the optimal strategy (i.e., using 75 as a decision threshold at the first
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opportunity). However, this is unlikely given that only 7 out of 23 participants’ credible inter-
vals of the empirical decision threshold, defined by the 95% highest density interval, included
75 (see Methods). Furthermore, the large across-individual variability in behavioral decision
thresholds (SDK = 2 = 15.45; Fig 3B) showcased that the Optimal decision model cannot
explain individuals’ decision strategies. These results again support the Subjective optimality
model suggesting that individuals make threshold-based choices in a finite sequential decision
problem, and that seemingly suboptimal decision patterns (e.g., waiting for future chances)
may have originated from the process of calculating thresholds using individuals’ subjective
value function.
Experiment 3
To further investigate physiological instantiation of the decision processes implemented in our
model, we examined changes of pupil diameter acquired while participants made a series of
Fig 3. Behavioral results of Experiment 2. (A) In individuals who had five opportunities (K = 5), empirical decision
thresholds (red) along the opportunities were comparable with that of Experiment 1. (B) To examine whether or not our
Subjective optimality model can be generalized to other contexts, a model prediction of the decision threshold was made for
K = 2 and 10; value sensitivity was assumed to be the same even in the different context, but the reference point was adjusted
proportionately to the changes of the expected payoff. Empirical (observed) decision thresholds (red) at the opportunity
preceding the last in the condition with two (K = 2), five (K = 5), or ten (K = 10) opportunities were consistent with the
prediction (blue). Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. (C) Model parameters were estimated using the Subjective
optimality model with a waiting cost. The parameters cannot be estimated for K = 2, because there is only one valid
opportunity per round for each individual. (D) The pattern within the decision curve (change in the slope of decision
threshold) was consistent in both of the Exp 2 data, and our Subjective optimality model successfully explained the pattern
(differences between the model and empirical data do not vary across opportunities; Exp2 (K = 5): F(2, 40) = 2.37, η2 = 0.11,
p = 0.11; Exp2 (K = 10): F(7, 119) = 0.67, η2 = 0.039, p = 0.70), and has superior explanatory power to the linear threshold
model. Negative values on the y-axis indicate that decision thresholds decrease between opportunities. Error bars indicate
s.e.m.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009633.g003
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choices. As noted earlier, we drew upon previous findings suggesting the role of pupil-linked
neuromodulatory systems in decision formation [26] and the association between pupil
responses with individuals’ choice patterns [27,28], and hypothesized that participants’ pupil
responses would reflect their subjective valuation defined within our suggested computational
model: i) deviation between option values and decision thresholds, ii) acceptance versus rejec-
tion decisions, and iii) individuals’ value sensitivity. To test this hypothesis, we operated a
slightly modified task; i) participants had to view the presented stimuli for a period of time
(1.5–2.5 seconds) before being allowed to accept or reject the stimuli, and ii) an audio cue was
used to announce to participants that they could make a choice (Fig 4A). This modification
temporally dissociated choice from other cognitive processes (e.g., valuation) and prevented
the introduction of any visual confounds in analyzing physiological signals at the time of deci-
sion-making. Participants had up to five opportunities per each round, and all other experi-
mental settings were equal to Experiment 2; the full distribution information was informed to
participants, and all participants played up to 200 rounds (see Methods for details).
Waiting is costly. Twenty-one new participants were recruited for Experiment 3 (10
females, age = 22.62 ± 2.38 years; non-overlapping from Experiments 1 or 2). With the addi-
tion of forced waiting time, which accumulated over opportunities, we expected that partici-
pants would perceive choices to accept after a longer wait less valuable [36,37] and thus, they
would accept earlier. Consistent with our expectation, a stark difference in the behavioral
Fig 4. Experimental procedures and behavioral results of Experiment 3. (A) To temporally dissociate valuation from action
selection, we implemented a modified task design where individuals had to wait for an audio cue to make choices. (B) Empirical
decision thresholds (red) were compared with the optimal decision thresholds (blue). Compared with Experiments 1 and 2, in
Experiment 3, individuals showed lower decision thresholds at the early opportunities. Error bars represent s.e.m. (C) The pattern
within the decision curve (change in the slope of decision threshold) was consistent in Exp 3 data, and our Subjective optimality
model successfully explained the pattern (differences between the model and empirical data do not vary across opportunities; F(2,
40) = 1.80, η2 = 0.082, p = 0.18), and has superior explanatory power to the linear threshold model. Negative values on the y-axis
indicate that decision thresholds decrease between opportunities. Error bars indicate s.e.m.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009633.g004
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pattern was observed in Experiment 3 compared to Experiments 1 and 2. Specifically, decision
thresholds from empirical data in Experiment 3 (red solid line) were below the optimal deci-
sion thresholds (blue dotted line), indicating that participants were more likely to accept small
numbers that they would have rejected in the other two experimental settings (Fig 4B).
This result was corroborated by the model-based results. First, the Subjective optimality
model with a waiting cost showed superior explanatory power for Experiment 3 compared
with alternative models (Fig A in S1 File), emphasizing again that the waiting cost plays an
important role in finite sequential decision-making [8,18]. In addition, as in both Experiments
1 and 2, empirical decision threshold curve showed negative second derivative, which is the
feature that Linear threshold model, unlike our Subjective optimality model, cannot capture
(Fig 4C). Second, the average of the estimated waiting cost parameter was significantly larger
than zero in Experiment 3 (t(20) = 63.51, Cohen’s d = 13.86, p = 1.51e-24), and it was larger
than the cost parameters in the other experiments (Experiment 3> 1: t(40) = 15.67, Cohen’s
d = 4.84, p< 1.00e-15; Experiment 3> 2 (K = 5): t(41) = 5.64, Cohen’s d = 1.72, p = 1.41e-6)
(Fig G in S1 File). Third, as it was intended from the task modification, individuals’ behavioral
change was sourced specifically back to the waiting cost parameter, such that other parameters
(nonlinear value sensitivity and reference point) were not affected (Fig G in S1 File). These
results together support our interpretation suggesting that the perceived cost of waiting under-
lies the behavioral alteration in the new task environment.
Pupil dilation reflects choice and decision difficulty. As described above, we then exam-
ined whether physiological responses reflect cognitive decision processes. First, we compared
pupil diameter changes between accepted and rejected opportunities. Consistent with previous
reports, pupil size was significantly different depending on the subsequent choices [26] (Fig
5A). Particularly, pupil dilations within 558–726 msec and 1182–1500 msec were associated
with subsequent acceptance of the presented values (t(17) > 2.11, all ps < 0.05). Only the latter
cluster remained significant after correcting for multiple comparisons using a cluster-based
permutation method [38] (pcorrected = 3.50e-4). Still, given the fact that the time of the earlier
cluster (558–726 msec) overlaps with the range of RTs in Experiments 1 and 2 (Fig 1C and
Fig A in S1 File), this result suggests that participants may have covertly made choices as
early as 550 msec and the cognitive process was reflected in the physiological responses [26]
(see Fig D in S1 File for a pupil size result reflecting individuals’ arousal level).
Fig 5. Pupillometry responses reflect subsequent choices and decision values. (A) Pupil size change from the stimuli onset was measured,
separately for the accepted (green) and rejected (red) opportunities. Paired comparison between the cases revealed significant pupil dilation
for the accepted stimuli at the early stage after the onset, and again at the later time. (B) To examine whether or not pupil size reflected
stimuli value, the peak pupil size between the stimuli onset and 1500 msec after the onset was depicted as a function of the signed distance
between stimuli value and the corresponding decision threshold. (C) Individuals who had higher value sensitivity in their estimated
parameter (median split; red) showed more pronounced pupillometric responses reflecting the value information. Shades represent s.e.m.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009633.g005
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Next, we calculated the peak pupil diameters between the stimuli onset and 1500msec after
the onset as a function of stimuli values. This was done for accepted and rejected stimuli sepa-
rately, so that the relationship between pupil sizes and values is independent of subsequent
choices. As we observed from RT patterns (Fig 1C and Fig A in S1 File), pupil size was posi-
tively correlated with ‘decision difficulty’. That is, pupil size decreased as a function of the
absolute distance between the decision threshold and value of the presented stimuli (slope =
-0.0105, t(17) = -3.15, Cohen’s d = -0.74, p = 0.0059; Fig 5B). A comparable result was observed
across all the opportunities (Fig E in S1 File) or when we used pupil diameter at 1500msec
after the onset, the latest time point when no single participant was allowed to make choices by
the task design. Together, these results suggest that pupil dilation reflects both decision diffi-
culty and subsequent choices [24,26], the two crucial components comprising subjective valua-
tion [39,40].
Physiological sensitivity matches behavioral value sensitivity. As evidenced by the
model parameter estimates, there are individual differences in the extent to which one
responds to a unit increase of presented stimulus value (i.e., value sensitivity). We tested
whether or not this modeling construct of individual characteristics matches with individuals’
physiological responses. To provide an illustrative description, we divided participants into
two subgroups based on their parameter estimation (median split) where one group had lower
value sensitivity and the other group had higher value sensitivity. For each group, we calcu-
lated average pupil dilation as a function of signed decision difficulty (the difference between
stimulus value and the decision threshold of the corresponding opportunity) (Fig 5C). Individ-
uals who had high value sensitivity (red) showed relatively high pupil dilation compared to
individuals who had low value sensitivity (blue). This positive correlation between value sensi-
tivity and pupil dilation was statistically significant within the signed decision difficulty
(Value–Thresholdi-th) ranging from -60 to -47 and from -22 to 40 (Pearson’s correlation
r> 0.47, all ps< 0.05). Only the latter cluster remained significant (pcorrected = 0.016) after cor-
recting for multiple comparisons using a cluster-based permutation method [38]. The result
indicates that individuals who have high behavioral value sensitivity indeed have higher physi-
ological sensitivity to stimuli value. Moreover, the consistent patterns across physiological and
behavioral data reflecting individuals’ characteristics serve as additional evidence suggesting
the use of subjective valuation in finite sequential decision-making.
Alternative mechanisms and factors
In the current study, we tested our hypothesis that individuals use subjective valuation and
dynamic programming approach during finite sequential decision-making. Here, we further
explored potential factors (e.g., regret, selection bias) that could be recruited and contribute to
biasing behavioral choices.
Regret model. It is possible that individuals may regret about the past choices, and thus
less likely to accept the stimuli values they previously rejected. To more directly examine
potential effects of “regret”, we simulated behavioral choices with additional computational
model assuming that participants would accept the candidates those are higher than the high-
est value they have rejected before (see Methods for simulation details). The Regret model par-
tially explain the observed empirical data (Fig 6A). The accumulated impacts of regrets, as
expected, is the part that allowed decision thresholds to have shallower slopes than the Opti-
mal. Note that the current Regret model assumed perfect memory, which simulates maximum
effect of previous stimuli value, and thus, was provided with the maximal power to explain
“flat” decision thresholds across opportunities induced by the regret. Our simulation results
suggest that, although we cannot rule out the impact of regret (see Discussion for further
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discussion about potential learning effects), the regret is not the major factor that underlies the
behavioral suboptimality.
Selection biases. It is possible that due to decision variabilities, participants’ choice
rounds where they happened to have lower decision thresholds would be accepted at earlier
opportunities, and thus be under-represented at subsequent opportunities. We ran a new sim-
ulation to implement how the behavioral pattern would become if the selection bias indeed is
the major factor that biases individuals away from the optimal behavioral pattern (see Methods
for simulation details). To test whether selection bias explains the flatness of the empirical
decision thresholds, we first, as the most conservative setting, assumed that the entire behav-
ioral choice variability contributes to the within-subject variability across rounds (see Methods
for justification). Based on the simulated choices, the model that explicitly incorporated selec-
tion bias (‘Selection bias model’ hereafter) partially explained the deviation from the optimal
thresholds and show relatively shallower slopes as expected (Fig 7A). However, compared to
empirical decision thresholds across opportunities, the simulation slopes were relatively
steeper even though the simulation was run with the maximum level of variability as we
described above. Note that in this simulation-based analysis, we are using the differences in
slopes across decision thresholds, rather than other features (e.g., the deviation at the initial
opportunities in Experiment 3), as criteria to examine whether the simulation model captures
the core mechanism explaining the empirical data.
Although our simulation using the maximum level of within-subject variability across
rounds was our attempt to give the Selection bias model the maximal power to explain “flat”
decision thresholds across opportunities, we additionally examined the impact of different lev-
els of within-subject variability on decision thresholds. There was a stark difference between
the simulated and empirical data when probed through the association between within-subject
variability across rounds and decision thresholds. Consistent with our description above, the
largest response variability in the Selection bias model was associated with the smallest thresh-
old change across opportunities, and vice versa (r = -0.97, P = 1.70e-40; Fig 7B). It was also
the case when part of the variability was attributed to across-opportunity rather than across-
round variability in the simulation (Fig 7C). On the contrary, empirical data revealed that
Fig 6. Subjective optimality model versus an alternative Regret model. As depicted in Fig I in S1 File, there are
potential effects of past stimuli values on the subsequent choice. (A) To more directly examine potential effects of
“regret”, individuals accept less likely the stimuli values that are above the optimal threshold but below a value which
they have previously rejected, decision thresholds simulated with a regret model are compared against the optimal
decision model and empirical data. Error bars indicate s.e.m. (B) Effects of past stimuli values on the current decision
were examined by applying the logistic regression analyses using the simulated data from the regret model. The regret
model predicts meaningful deviation from the optimal model in the 3rd and 4th opportunities, and the deviation can be
attributed to the negative weight on the preceding opportunities. However, the regret model, inconsistent with the
observed pattern from the empirical data (Fig I in S1 File), predicts that the value in the earlier opportunities will affect
the current decision more than the value in the recent past. Error bars indicate s.e.m.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009633.g006
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participants who had the largest response variability showed the largest threshold change
across opportunities (r = 0.43, P = 5.21e-04), which is the exact opposite of the Selection bias
model. Together, these results suggest that selection bias cannot explain empirical decision
patterns observed in this task.
Discussion
Our results provide a model-based explanation for suboptimality in finite sequential decision-
making. Specifically, we present evidence that subjective valuation reflecting individuals’ belief
about the environment underlies the mechanism of how the brain computes decision thresh-
olds in the problem.
As a classic example of a finite sequential decision problem, various versions of the secretary
problem were investigated [1,2]. The standard secretary problem simulates the cases where
only the relative ranks matter, such that individuals have to find the best option among the
sequentially presented options [7,41]. In this setting, inferior choices lead to no reward, but we
have to note that this is hardly the case in real-life. First, any choices we make should have
some value even in the case where they were not the best option. For example, an employee
who ends up not meeting the employer’s original expectation still can make some contribution
(unless the employee turns out to be a con artist and shuts down the business). Second, in real-
ity, it is impossible for the decision maker to learn the true relative rank of the chosen option,
Fig 7. Subjective optimality model versus a potential impact of selection bias. Diminishing decision thresholds across
opportunities alternatively may be driven by a combination of within-subject decision variability and selection bias where rounds
in which decision thresholds happened to be higher (due to the within-subject variability across rounds) lasting further at later
opportunities. (A) To directly examine this effect, decision thresholds simulated with a selection bias are compared against the
optimal decision model and empirical data. The Selection bias model can explain the observed empirical data fairly well for some
of the parts in Experiments 1 and 2, but not all of the patterns. Error bars indicate s.e.m. (B) We additionally examined the impact
of different levels of within-subject variability on decision thresholds. There was a stark difference between the simulated and
empirical data when probed through the association between within-subject variability and decision thresholds. The largest
response variability in the Selection bias model was associated with the smallest threshold change across opportunities, and vice
versa (r = -0.97, P = 1.70e-40). On the contrary, participants who had the largest response variability showed the largest threshold
change across opportunities (r = 0.43, P = 5.21e-04), which is the exact opposite of the Selection bias model. Each dot represents
individual simulation. (C) To examine the impact of across-round versus opportunity variability, we ran additional simulations
with varying proportion of across-round variability out of the maximum amount of variability. As the proportion of variability
attributed to across-round against the across-opportunity variability, the threshold-change gradually decreased from the level of
the optimal behavior, and the correlation between threshold-change and response variability asymptotes to -1, decreasing from 0.
Levels of threshold change for the empirical data (red) and the Optimal model (blue) are illustrated together as references.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009633.g007
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because the decision maker will have no knowledge about the subsequent options that were to
follow. In other words, there is no one who can examine the success of the choice and deliver a
reward if, and only if, the choice were correct. The current study addressed this discrepancy by
implementing a task where each option had a monetary reward that matched its face value [4].
Although there was no explicit instruction saying that individuals should find the best option
within the finite number of opportunities, participants were informed that the final payoff
would be determined by the accumulated reward amount across the entire task and thus, the
task preserved the goal of reward maximization (see Fig J in S1 File for number of accepted
occasions at each opportunity). We believe that the current variation of the secretary problem
provides a more naturalistic setting to investigate individuals’ sequential decision-making.
A typical behavior pattern observed across various versions of the secretary problem is that
individuals show suboptimal choices, such that they wait less than the optimal stopping point
[8,17,42]. This suboptimal choice tendency is accounted for by lower decision thresholds than
the optimal decision threshold, indicating that they are more likely to accept the option that
has low value. However, a recent study reported the opposite pattern, i.e., higher decision
thresholds compared to the optimal, in a variant of optimal stopping problem, and suggested a
possibility that choice biases may occur in both direction [10]. Among the potential factors
why they think they observed the opposite pattern (e.g., usage of naturalistic image stimuli),
Furl et al. [10] suspected that a sampling incentive being larger than a sampling cost might
underlie participants’ motivation to oversample. Although Furl et al. [10] reported that this
sampling reward model does not match their empirical data, our results across the three exper-
iments were consistent with this perspective. Specifically, individuals showed higher thresholds
for both Experiments 1 and 2 (oversampling), but lower thresholds for Experiment 3 (under-
sampling). The main change in Experiment 3 was the additional forced wait introduced before
the cue when participants were allowed to submit their choice. Our model-based analysis
results suggest that this subtle change in task design may have triggered participants to think
more about the tradeoff between payoffs and time they spent per round. Such an impact of
additional ‘cost of waiting (extra time)’ is consistent with previous reports showing that non-
zero interview cost was associated with lowering decision thresholds [8,17,18,43]. Our model
parameter estimates support this interpretation, such that the estimated cost was significantly
larger than zero in Experiment 3 where individuals were provided with additional forced waits
and in Experiment 2 with more abundant opportunities (K = 10) where individuals were given
with further opportunities. These results highlight that the context of decision-making (e.g.,
task schedule) as well as the extent to which individuals find the task costly (e.g., cognitively
demanding or mentally boring) are crucial in decision-making processes [44]. In the current
study, we hypothesized a waiting cost as a single component encompassing various types of
mental cost and focused on its mechanistic involvement. Future studies exploring the source
of the waiting cost may further our understandings about how and why individuals sometimes
make choices impulsively or patiently.
Our Subjective optimality model included two free parameters essential in capturing indi-
viduals’ choice patterns. First, the reference point reflects each individual’s belief about the
environment [13]. It is known that beliefs can alter how individuals respond to given informa-
tion [45], and specifically in the current study, we hypothesized that different contexts (i.e.,
numbers of available opportunities) would change expectations about future outcomes, which
in turn would alter individuals’ reference points [33]. In line with this, we showed that discour-
aged expectation (scarce opportunities in Experiment 2; K = 2) causes individuals to be more
pessimistic about future chances and wait less in deciding (lowering thresholds). Moreover,
encouraged expectation under abundant opportunities (K = 10 in Experiment 2) seemed like
causing individuals to be more optimistic about future changes and wait longer. Such an
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increment of expectation in response to abundant opportunities parallels a recent study in
marketing where they observed higher expectation in individuals’ satisfaction for the choices
from larger than smaller set of assortments [46]. Interestingly, individuals’ expectations (refer-
ence point) were significantly higher when they did not have full information about stimuli
distribution (Experiment 1). This result suggests that an optimistic bias [47], potentially gener-
ated due to the uncertainty about upper bound in the current study, may diminish or even
become inverted in other contexts (e.g., scarce opportunities, mental costs).
Second, the nonlinear value sensitivity indicates the extent to which individuals’ subjective
valuation increases for an additional unit of reward. In the current study, the sensitivity repre-
sented as an exponent term in the utility function was smaller than one, which captures mar-
ginally diminishing returns for gains and marginally increasing returns for losses [13]. In our
suggested model, a range of value sensitivity characterizes a spectrum of decision characteris-
tics in individuals. Value sensitivity close to zero represents a rather categorical valuation (gain
or loss relative to the reference point) and choices that are accounted for by a constant thresh-
old being insensitive to the context (i.e., remaining opportunities). On the other hand, value
sensitivity close to one represents objective valuation and choices that follow the Optimal deci-
sion model. In concert with the reference point, individuals’ value sensitivity shapes the extent
to which they take into account uncertainty of future opportunities in decision-making. This
wide range of individual differences may explain why some individuals are more stubborn
with their opinions (e.g., stereotype), while others easily adapt to contextual information [48].
The conclusions of the present study regarding the subjective valuation recruited in deter-
mining decision thresholds differ from previous findings by Baumann et al. [34], who argued
that people rely on a mental heuristic and determine their thresholds linearly. As illustrated in
our formal model comparison (Fig A in S1 File), individuals’ behavioral choices in each
opportunity were explained by the Linear threshold model as well as by the Subjective optimal-
ity model. However, the decision patterns between opportunities were not accounted for by a
linear decrease in decision thresholds, which is the main feature of the Linear threshold model
(Figs 2C, 3D and 4C). This discrepancy suggests that individuals’ choice data at least in the cur-
rent variant of Secretary problem tasks cannot be fully explained by linear heuristic processes.
Nevertheless, subtle differences in task designs (e.g., stimuli values followed a normal distribu-
tion in Baumann et al. [34], but a uniform distribution in the current study) may recruit differ-
ent cognitive strategies. On the same line, we acknowledge that there might be other factors
(e.g., regret, memory, selection bias) and their combination which would be able to explain
choice patterns during the task, and thus future studies should explore potential factors that
affect individuals’ decision processes.
In the current study, the pupil responses encode both decision difficulty and the subsequent
choice of whether individuals will accept or reject the presented stimulus. Both types of infor-
mation temporally preceded actual choice, so these pupil dilations are the physiological repre-
sentations of the processed information regarding decision-making, rather than a simple
reflection of the presented visual information [26]. As suggested from previous studies, pupil
dilation may reflect the downstream processing of the anterior cingulate cortex [24,25], the
brain region that is involved in encoding decision difficulty [49], and, more broadly, a wealth
of value-related information—including difficulty signals—during decision-making processes
[40]. Differential pupil sizes depending on the subsequent choices suggest that there is more to
neurophysiological representation than simple decision difficulties. The pupil responses may
be reflecting the involvement of the neuromodulatory systems (e.g., locus coeruleus [50]) in
decision processes through release of norepinephrine, which temporarily facilitates computa-
tions in cortical networks [22,26]. During the process of decision-making, individuals who
had higher value sensitivity showed exaggerated pupil responses reflecting both decision
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difficulty and subsequent choice information. This correlation result indicates that ‘behavior-
level sensitivity’ we extracted from our model is consistent with an independent ‘neurophysiol-
ogy-level sensitivity’. Consistent with previous studies, our pupillometry results evidence the
association between neurophysiological pupil responses and individuals’ characteristics in val-
uation [27], and support a mechanistic account of seemingly suboptimal decision strategies in
finite sequential decisions.
Alternatively, the observed pupil responses could be a result of top-down control, such that
individuals may pay more attention to the stimuli that they plan to accept for accumulating
more evidence [51] or a process following the opposite causality, in that the rich amount of
accumulated evidence of a particular stimulus may induce even higher attention levels (e.g.,
saliency driven bottom-up attention [52]). In the current study, the latter is unlikely, given that
all low-level visual information (e.g., contrast) of the displayed stimuli were matched or con-
trolled for. To sum up, the current results show that the two pieces of information essential in
subjective valuation are linked together at the physiological level, deeply involved in the pro-
cess of decision formation [26].
The future direction of the current study includes expanding our model further, so that it
can capture more realistic decision contexts where various factors may interact (e.g., confi-
dence, concerns about sunk cost, limitation of information processing capacity). The first and
foremost extension should be to explain the mechanisms of how individuals learn the stimulus
distribution (e.g., reinforcement learning). Previous studies reported no evidence of learning
in various versions of the secretary problem [8,53]. In line with these studies, in the current
study, we assumed that the learning process is rapid and negligible in relevance to other deci-
sion processes. Nevertheless, we conducted two explorative analyses examining potential
learning effects. First, each individual’s task data were divided into the first and the second
half. Across all three experiments, decision thresholds estimated from the first and the second
halves were comparable, indicating no sign of extensive learning (Fig H in S1 File). Second, we
ran a series of logistic regressions to examine the impact of presented stimulus at the preceding
opportunity in subsequent choices. There was a slight hint of negative influence of preceding
stimuli on subsequent choices, but the beta coefficients were less than 1/10 of the betas of the
current stimulus (Fig I in S1 File). Moreover, we showed that decision processes under imper-
fect information (no knowledge of the maximum value) were comparable with the processes
under the full information. These results suggest that, even without explicit information about
the stimuli distribution, people, in general, have a rough idea about the range of values of an
uncertain option. Alternatively, people were able to learn early enough [6] that the behavioral
strategy for the rest of the task was not different from the case where individuals knew about
the distribution from the beginning (c.f., see [35] for dynamic reference point). Still, inclusion
of learning mechanisms in the model (e.g., learning what to expect, regretting previous
choices) would be essential to examine whether or not the decision model generalizes to
broader contexts (e.g., volatile environment).
Examples of finite sequential decision problems span a wide range of life choices, includ-
ing finding the right life partner and choosing a career, the aims of which are to maximize
reward under a limited amount of resources and opportunities. Such value-based decision
processes with reference to costs are not unique to humans but extend from fish choosing a
mate, who become less selective under costly environments [54], to primates making forag-
ing decisions [55]. The Subjective optimality model provides a way in which individual sub-
jective valuation generates systematic biases in sequential decision-making and opens a
window to decompose physiological responses into decision difficulty and signatures of sub-
sequent choice, of which levels differ in the extent of individual value sensitivity. In sum, our
data support a mechanistic account of suboptimal choices varying from overly impulsive
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choices in individuals with substance-use problems [56] to delayed choices in individuals
who suffer from indecisiveness [57].
Methods
Ethics statement
The current study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Ulsan National Institu-
tion of Science and Technology (UNISTIRB-18-39-C, UNISTIRB-18-14-A). All participants
provided written informed consent and were paid for their participation.
Participants
One hundred eleven healthy young adults (male/female = 55/56, age = 22.72 ± 2.04 years) par-
ticipated in the current study. None of the participants reported a history of neurological or
psychiatric illness. Three separate experiments were conducted and there were no overlapping
participants across experiments. Twenty students participated in Experiment 1 (male/
female = 10/10, age = 22.85 ± 1.31 years), and 67 students were recruited for Experiment 2
where they had two, five, or ten opportunities per round (male/female = 33/34, age =
22.70 ± 2.15 years). Among the participants in Experiment 2, three participants were excluded
from the analyses due to their reported suspicion about the payment structure of the experi-
ment. Among the included participants, 23 participants (male/female = 11/12, age = 23.09 ±
2.09 years) were assigned to the condition where they were given two opportunities per round,
21 students (male/female = 11/10, age = 23.19 ± 1.86 years) were randomly assigned to the
condition where they were given five opportunities per round, and 20 participants (male/
female = 10/10, age = 22.00 ± 2.41 years) were assigned to the condition where they were given
ten opportunities per round. Twenty-four students participated in Experiment 3 (male/
female = 12/12, age = 22.67 ± 2.28 years). Two participants were excluded due to their reported
suspicion about the payment structure of the experiment, and one participant was excluded
due to data loss from a computer error. Three participants were excluded from the pupil diam-
eter analyses due to poor calibration. After exclusion, data from 21 participants (male/
female = 11/10, age = 22.62 ± 2.38 years) were used for behavioral analyses, and a subsample of
the data (N = 18; male/female = 8/10, age = 22.33 ± 2.30 years) was used for further pupil
diameter analyses. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision under soft
contact lenses (no glasses were allowed due to potential reflections during eye-tracking). The
sample size of each experiment was based on those used in similar studies using finite sequen-
tial decision-making paradigms [e.g., 7,17].
Stimuli and apparatus
All stimuli were generated using Psychophysics Toolbox Version 3 (http://www.psychtoolbox.
org/) and MATLAB R2017a (MathWorks), and presented on a DLP projector (PROPixx
VPX-PRO-5050B; screen size of 163 × 92 cm2; resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels; refresh rate of
120 Hz; linear gamma). The distance between the participants’ eyes and screen was fixed at
153 cm. The ambient and background luminance were set at 1.1 and 69.2 cd/m2, respectively.
The main stimuli were three-digit integer numbers, randomly selected between zero and 150.
To minimize luminance effects on pupil size, one- or two- digit numbers were displayed as
three-digit numbers with extra zeros attached in front of the stimuli (e.g., 1 is displayed as
‘001’). During the task, fixation was enforced at the center of the screen with an infrared eye
tracker (Eyelink 1000 Plus, SR Research, Canada), and a chin and forehead rest were used to
minimize head movement.
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Experiments
At the beginning of the task, the eye-tracker was calibrated, referencing eye fixation data at the
four corners of the screen. During the task, participants made a series of choices either to
accept or to reject presented stimuli (Fig 1A). As explained above, the stimuli were randomly
selected integers between zero and 150 where each number had equal probability of being
selected (uniform distribution). Each presented number could be considered as an option
whose value matches its face value because participants were instructed that all accepted num-
bers would be added to their final payoff at the end of the task. Given this knowledge, partici-
pants had a fixed number of opportunities (chances) to evaluate and reject a new randomly
selected number. The present ‘round’ ended when participants accepted a presented number
within this limited number of opportunities, or when they ran out of the opportunities where
they had no other choice but to accept the presented number at the last chance. At the begin-
ning of each opportunity, participants were shown which opportunity they were currently at,
so that they would not lose track of the number of remaining opportunities. A new round fol-
lowed, at which the number of available opportunities was reset to the original maximum
quantity. Participants were paid at the end of the study (after completing 200 rounds), based
on the sum of the numbers they chose during the task. All instructions were provided through
illustrated slides.
Overall, we implemented three separate experiments, each of which had slightly different
settings. In Experiment 1, participants had up to five opportunities (K = 5), and they were not
explicitly informed of the maximum number (150) that would be presented. Use of the context
with incomplete information was to incorporate a more naturalistic setting as real-life prob-
lems where, as in most of the cases, individuals do not have knowledge about the best potential
option (e.g., even if the current candidate for a job has a good enough fit for the position, one
cannot assure that a potential future candidate will not have a superior fit). Participants were
instructed that the presented stimuli would be sampled from a uniform distribution, and thus,
we expected that participants would quickly deduce the maximum range through iterative
experiences. At the beginning of the new round, the accumulated payoff amount up until the
last round was presented at the bottom of the screen. In Experiment 2, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of three conditions where one condition had two (K = 2), one condition
had five (K = 5), and one condition had ten (K = 10) opportunities. Here, participants were
also informed of the maximum number (i.e., 150). In addition, participants were given a prac-
tice session that comprised two rounds where all the stimuli were ‘000’, which allowed them to
be familiarized with associated buttons and the task screen settings. All the rest of the task set-
tings were identical to Experiment 1.
Experiment 3 was designed to temporally dissociate actions (i.e., accept or reject) from the
stimulus onset, so that physiological responses to stimuli independent from potential motor
preparatory signals could be measured. Particularly in Experiment 3, participants were not
allowed to make choices until an audio cue was played (Fig 4). The audio cue was played
between 1.5 and 2.5 seconds after stimulus onset (uniform distribution), which allowed us to
tease out potential confounding factors related to action from the pupil diameter measures at
0–1.5 seconds after stimulus onset. In addition, to prevent participants from making unneces-
sary eye movements, all the information including number stimuli were presented at the cen-
ter of the screen. As implemented in Experiment 2 where K = 5, participants were informed
that the maximum number was 150 and that they have up to five chances to evaluate the sti-
muli per each round.
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Behavioral analysis
For all three tasks, behavioral choices (accept or reject) and response time (RT) were mea-
sured. Individuals’ decision threshold for each opportunity was estimated from their choices.
To estimate empirical decision threshold for each opportunity, a cumulative distribution func-
tion of Gaussian distribution was fitted to individuals’ choice data that corresponded to the
same opportunity across all 200 rounds. The mean and variance parameters of the Gaussian
distribution represent the decision threshold and decision variability, respectively. A set of
best-fitting parameters that maximize the likelihood of the data was estimated per individual
using the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm provided by MATLAB R2017b.
Computational modeling and model comparison
For a formal model comparison at the group level, choices from all 200 rounds per participant
were used for parameter estimation. We used likelihood-ratio tests to compare goodness-of-fit
of the models for explaining participants’ decisions.
Optimal decision model
An optimal decision maker is expected to maximize their payoff by estimating the expected
value of each opportunity. This computation can be conducted from the final opportunity to
the first, given the full information about the stimuli distribution (U[0, 150]). For example, in
a condition where K = 5, the expected value of the last opportunity is 75, and therefore a pay-
off-maximizing optimal decision maker should set 75 as the decision threshold of the fourth
opportunity (i.e., accept numbers larger than 75 and reject those that are lower). Then, this
decision strategy should again determine the expected value of the fourth opportunity. Gener-
alizing this dynamic programming approach, the decision threshold of the ith opportunity (ϑ
[i]) can be written as follows:
W i½ � ¼
bW½iþ 1�c
151





v ði 2 K   1;K   2; . . . ; 1ð ÞÞ
W K½ � ¼ 0
where bxc indicates the greatest integer less than or equal to x.
Subjective optimality model
Our hypothesis was that individuals use subjective valuation in reference to their own expecta-
tions about the environment during finite sequential decision-making. To test the hypothesis,
we constructed a computational model drawn upon Prospect theory [13]. Particularly, individ-
uals’ subjective valuation (Util) of an objective value (v) was defined as below:
UtilðvÞ ¼ v   rð Þr if v � r
UtilðvÞ ¼   r   vð Þr otherwise
where ρ and r indicate individuals’ nonlinear value sensitivity and reference point, respec-
tively. Subjective valuation is also used in computing decision thresholds:
W i½ �¼ Util  1
bW½iþ 1�c
151







where Util-1(.) indicates an inverse function of the aforementioned subjective value function
and Util(ϑ[i+1]) indicates the expected utility of continuing the game.
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Subjective optimality model with a waiting cost
In our secretary problem task, choosing to reject the current stimulus means that participants
have to go through further steps (opportunities) to receive rewards (or at least to find out how
much reward they will receive) until they choose to accept at a later opportunity. Such an addi-
tional wait may introduce a disutility (i.e., negative value) against the choice to reject. To test
this possibility and quantitatively estimate this ‘mental waiting cost’, we modified our sug-
gested Subjective optimality model to a more general format as follows:
W i½ �¼ Util  1
bW½iþ 1�c
151





Util vð Þ   C
� �
where C indicates a waiting cost per opportunity. Note that the waiting cost lowers the
expected utility of the following opportunity (i+1th), and thus has an effect of lowering the
decision threshold of the current opportunity (ith).
Constant threshold model
There is a simple alternative decision strategy for the secretary problem: to use a constant deci-
sion threshold throughout all opportunities. To examine this possibility, we estimated one
decision threshold per individual. This constant threshold model provides a quantitative base-
line for a formal model comparison.
Independent threshold model
The Independent threshold model is the model in which a decision threshold for each oppor-
tunity was independently estimated. This model does not hypothesize any mechanistic associa-
tions among opportunities, but focuses on capturing individuals’ choice tendencies in each
opportunity.
Linear threshold model
In a recent study, Baumann et al. [34] suggested a linear threshold model that assumes a linear
relationship among the thresholds across the opportunities (i.e., Thresholdi-th = a + bi where a
and b are free parameters) [34]. Note that in this Linear threshold model, a decision maker
does not need to use dynamic programming approach. One key feature that clearly dissociates
the Linear threshold model from other models is the linear relationship in decision thresholds
between opportunities.
Regret model
We constructed a model where participants would accept candidates that are higher than both
the optimal threshold and the highest value they have passed up in previous opportunities. To
examine the maximum impact of past stimuli values, we applied the aforementioned rule of
regret as deterministic decision thresholds at each opportunity and also assumed perfect mem-
ory. That is, all the past stimuli values, rather than the most recent stimulus, affect decisions
within the corresponding round. We simulated 10000 rounds of behavioral choices of pseudo-
subjects, and estimated the decision thresholds and the effects of past values on the current
decision. These steps are repeated 20 times to verify the reliability of the estimations. Because
the model is a combination between the Optimal decision model and the regret, decision
thresholds at the initial opportunities are always the same as those from the Optimal decision
model. Note that in this simulation-based analysis, we are using the differences in slopes across
decision thresholds, rather than other features (e.g., the deviation at the initial opportunities in
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Experiment 3), as criteria to examine whether the simulation model captures the core mecha-
nism explaining the empirical data.
Selection bias model
One of the sources of potential variability in individuals’ decision thresholds is within-subject
variability that affects individuals’ across-round behaviors. To run the simulation, we calcu-
lated the behavioral choice variability from the entire data (across- opportunities and rounds),
and assumed it all would contribute to the within-subject variability across rounds (i.e., there
is no across-opportunity variability within a round). This is the most conservative setting,
because large across-round variability opens up the possibility that only the rounds in which
decision thresholds happened to be high decision thresholds to contribute to the post-hoc esti-
mation of the later opportunities; in turn, this would make the estimated decision thresholds
to have a shallower slope (more flat) across opportunities compared to the optimal decision
model.
Predicting change of decision threshold based on the altered decision
context
To examine whether or not our suggested model can be generalized under different contexts
with scarce opportunities, we took a prediction approach using model-based information
from the context with abundant opportunities. Specifically, the reference point and nonlinear
value sensitivity parameters estimated from behavioral choices of individuals (N = 21) who
participated in Experiment 2, K = 5 were used to predict the decision threshold in the two
(K = 2) and ten (K = 10) opportunities condition. Particularly for the nonlinear value sensitiv-
ity, the parameter distribution in the K = 2 or 10 condition was assumed to be the same as that
in the K = 5 condition. On the other hand, the parameter distribution of the reference point
was assumed to be shifted down by the difference of expected earnings between the two condi-
tions, reflecting participants’ acknowledgement of the scarce or abundant number of opportu-
nities. Specifically, we calculated the expected value across all opportunities for each condition
(K = 2, 5, and 10), and assumed their difference to indicate the extent to which participants
changed their expectation about earnings from average number of opportunities (K = 5) to
either abundant (K = 10) or scarce (K = 2) opportunities. To predict the mean threshold in the
K = 2 condition, 23 pairs of parameters (matching the number of participants in K = 2) were
randomly sampled with replacement from the aforementioned parameter distribution, and the
thresholds corresponding to each parameter pair were computed by applying our model. The
mean threshold in the K = 10 condition was predicted following the same procedure. The pro-
cedure was repeated 5,000 times to estimate the distribution of the mean of 23 thresholds. The
95% confidence interval was computed from the 5,000 means.
Parameter estimation procedure
We used Bayesian hierarchical analysis to estimate the best-fitting parameters for participants’
choice data [58]. Here in all the tested models, we introduced a gaussian noise around com-
puted decision thresholds, which mirrors the stochastic nature of choices rather than assuming
that choices are made deterministically before and after each threshold value (as applied in Sig-
nal detection theory). The width of the gaussian noise is set as a free parameter (termed as a
decision variability s) and estimated in individual-level.
The parameters characterizing individual participants were drawn from the population dis-
tributions, each of which follows a Gaussian distribution. The priors on the means of the popu-
lation distributions (μ) were set to broad uniform distributions, and the priors on the SDs (σ)
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were set to an inverse-Gamma distribution in each of which, the shape parameter alpha is one
and the scale parameter beta is manually selected. To improve sampling efficiency, we sampled
the parameters from a transformed space, and the hierarchical structure was assumed in the
transformed space. Specifically, the reference point and value sensitivity parameters were sam-
pled without domain restrictions and transformed by a scaled logistic function g(x) = A/(1
+exp(-x)) before applying to the model. In the function g(x), A was set to 150 for the reference
point parameter r, and set to 2 for the values sensitivity parameter ρ. The decision variability
parameters and the group-level hyper-parameters for parameters’ standard deviation were
transformed by exp(.) after sampling. We did not apply a transformation to the waiting cost
parameter. A Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (Metropolis-Hastings algorithm)
was used to sample from the posterior density of the parameters conditioned on all of the
participants’ choices. We estimated the most likely set of parameters for each participant from
the resulting chain of samples using a multivariate Gaussian kernel function provided by
MATLAB R2017b.
Pupillometry: Preprocessing
Pupil diameter was sampled at 500 Hz from both eyes using an infrared eye-tracker (Eyelink
1000 Plus; SR Research, Kanata, Canada) and recorded continuously for the entire session.
Blinks and saccades in each eye were identified using the standard criteria provided by Eyelink,
and the identified intervals were linearly interpolated. Particularly for the blink events, the
interpolation was applied to the intervals between 150 ms before and after each identified
blink. Three participants whose pupil data included a large proportion of interpolated intervals
(> 50%) were excluded from further analyses. The means of the interpolated data from both
eyes were band-pass filtered between 0.02–4 Hz using third-order Butterworth filters. The
long-lasting effects (~ 5 sec) of blinks on pupil diameter were identified by applying least-
squares deconvolution to individual data, and then removed from the data [59]. Then, the
resulting data were z-scored for each session (i.e., each participant). Pupil diameter changes in
response to the value stimulus were computed for each opportunity. Each epoch was defined
for pupil responses between -200 and 1,500 msec around the stimulus onset, and corrected for
its baseline by subtracting the mean pupil size around (± 20 msec) the onset. The choice trials
that required a large proportion (> 50%) of interpolation were excluded from the analysis,
which comprised 28% of the entire choice trials. Applying more liberal exclusion criteria
(excluding the trials that required substantially large proportion (>90%) to be interpolated)
did not alter any of the pupillometry results (Fig F in S1 File).
Pupillometry: Statistical tests
To examine whether physiological responses reflect cognitive decision processes, we tested
pupil dilations and contractions in response to (i) subsequent choices to accept or reject, and
(ii) decision difficulty. First, pupil diameter changes between 0–1,500 msec after the stimulus
onset were compared between accepted and rejected opportunities. We used t-tests to compare
mean differences at each time step and defined statistically significant temporal clusters (alpha
level set to 0.05). To control for the false alarm rate, we used the cluster-based permutation
method [38] and examined the statistical significance of each cluster. Particularly in the per-
mutation procedure, the sign of the difference value for each participant was randomized and
the sum of t-values in each cluster was used as its statistic. Second, the peak pupil dilation
between the stimuli onset and 1,500 msec after the stimulus onset was used to examine the
effect of decision difficulty—the absolute distance between the corresponding decision thresh-
old and the presented value—on the pupil dilation. Linear regression was used for the rejected
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trials (choice = reject, -40 < Value—Thresholdi-th < 5) and accepted trials (choice = accept,
-5< Value—Thresholdi-th < 40) separately for each participant. The same set of data points
was used to test the effect of choice on pupil dilation after controlling for the decision diffi-
culty. We further investigated individual differences in the extent to which one responds to
stimulus value at the physiological level (i.e., pupil dilation). We smoothed each individual’s
pupil dilation data along the threshold centered values (i.e., Value–Thresholdi-th) ranging from
-90 to 60 by applying local regression using a 2D polynomial model provided by MATLAB
R2017b. The estimated pupil dilation at threshold was used to calculate the Pearson correlation
between individuals’ estimated value sensitivity and their pupil responses.
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